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Synopsis  
 
Britain’s railways are a success story.  The rail industry needs now to change to 
sustain the remarkable progress of the last decade.  To get the best service for its 
customers and a good deal for the taxpayer, the industry needs the freedom to 
innovate, to deliver better value and to make rail more attractive for passengers and 
freight. For too long the rail industry, the government, and the regulator have 
created ever more byzantine funding and decision-making structures, and since 
privatisation regulator and government have been drawn into operational detail 
instead of being focused on what matters – ensuring the industry serves its 
customers at the best price for the taxpayer.  
 
 
  
                                                          
1  Chief Executive, Office of Rail Regulation, 1 Kemble Street, London, WC2B 4AN.           
   www.rail-reg.gov.uk  
I am grateful for the advice and comments of a number of people, including:  
Luisa Affuso, Michael Beswick, Dan Brown, Terry Gourvish, John Larkinson, Roger 
McDonald, Ian Prosser, Cathryn Ross, Jon Stern and Elise Weeder.  I am particularly 
grateful to Ronan Devaney at the ORR for his comments and for helping to bring it all 
together, and to Adrian Shooter for being a first-rate discussant.  Any errors or omissions 
are my own.    
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Summary 
 
Britain’s railways have made enormous progress over the last decade.  They have 
undergone a remarkable recovery following a crisis in the early years of privatisation, 
with high levels of sustained growth in demand, a good recent safety record, and 
punctuality and customer satisfaction at near-record levels.  But that has come at a 
cost.  It has taken a decade to bring the railway’s costs under control, and there 
remains a significant efficiency penalty, substantially funded by taxpayers.  Rail now 
faces a huge opportunity to consolidate its position and continue to grow; but to do 
so it will need to move to the next level of maturity as an industry, developing its 
commercialism, capabilities, culture and confidence.   
 
The support of government and other funders is an important part of shaping what 
the railway delivers, and always will be.  Government’s role is central, in assessing 
what the country wants from its railway, and the services and capacity which are in 
the interests of promoting growth, connectivity and environmental benefits but 
which it will never be profitable for the market to deliver. However, the dependence 
of rail on unfocused subsidy, as opposed to subsidy linked to clearly-specified 
outputs, is a significant impediment to this transformation.  It undermines 
commercial decision-making throughout the system, with many decisions on the 
detail of delivery – as opposed to what society wants from the railway – taken in 
government.  This contrasts with the potential, in the privatised railway, for rail 
businesses to shape solutions which reflect their expert understanding of how 
operations, planning, technology, innovation, customer satisfaction and growth 
come together.   
 
Over a long period, the industry’s confidence and capability has suffered from an 
unhealthy symbiosis of decisions being taken out of the hands of rail businesses; 
together with financial arrangements which misalign costs and revenue so that 
commercial decisions are blurred or distorted.  Behaviours are to a fair degree driven 
by subsidy and intervention by government and regulator rather than commercial 
decisions.  That drives up the costs of delivering what funders and customers want. 
Bureaucratic, rather than commercial, decision-making is deeply embedded in large 
parts of the industry.   
 
Noone should get the impression that it is all gloom and doom.  I meet committed, 
driven, innovative people everywhere I go on the railway, at all levels. Recent 
developments in the industry’s leadership mean there is a growing commitment to 
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change. But the current arrangements for delivering subsidy and regulating the 
industry make it an up-hill struggle. 
  
There is an opportunity now, and in the next decade, to transform this so that rail 
becomes the dynamic, mature, efficient and customer-focused industry envisaged 
at privatisation.  
 
If the industry can deliver on the efficiency challenge that now faces it, it will be 
possible to reduce its dependence on public subsidy, and to get much greater 
transparency on where public money goes and what it buys. I am sure national and 
local funders will want to continue to support rail, but the industry needs to give 
them better information for making choices over how their money is used and more 
clarity on what they get for it – specifying what is to be delivered, and looking to the 
industry to develop its creativity and innovation to shape how best to deliver.  
 
As it becomes less dependent on subsidy, beyond the specific services and capacity 
funders choose to buy, the industry ought to become freer to take its own decisions 
on how best to meet its customers’ expectations and grow demand. There is 
further to go on customer satisfaction, and rail businesses need to focus on how 
they can meet rising expectations through better customer service, better 
information, and innovation - providing more of what people want to buy at better 
value – just as private businesses do in other industries. This potential is all the 
greater now, given the scope for major changes in the way the railway operates 
through electrification and transformed signalling and information systems.   
  
This is a real challenge in an industry where finances are opaque and decision-
making byzantine in its complexity. That needs to change. As efficiency improves I 
believe we can move towards a railway in which businesses can come together in a 
commercial way to deliver for their customers, potentially with less intervention 
from ORR and government. We can transform the way the industry operates in the 
next decade, and all of us need to step up to make that a reality.   
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Introduction 
 
Thank you for inviting me to give this Beesley Lecture.  
 
Michael Beesley himself had many things to say about railways and privatisation. 
Indeed, before these lectures were named the ‘Beesleys’, he presented an 
outstanding lecture on the role of subsidy in rail privatisation in the 1997 series.2  It’s 
always tempting to look back and pull out the points that support your case, but 
Beesley did refer to many of the themes which, 15 years later, remain at the heart 
of the challenge for the privatised railway.   
 
• the need for independent assessment of required railway output, and for 
independent translation of that output into railway subsidy; 
• the expectation that continuing subsidy will cost less because of prospective 
increases in efficiency; 
• the proper attribution of costs to users so that decisions can be taken on 
what is to be delivered and how.  
 
All of these themes raised by Michael Beesley in 1997 are themes which I will pick 
up this evening.       
 
This lecture is in three parts: 
 
• in the first part, I will explain why rail matters; and consider how events over 
the last decades have shaped the industry, its performance, and its 
regulation;  
 
• in the second, I will talk about why we regulate the railways, and the 
challenges the industry faces in meeting the expectations of its customers 
and funders;  
 
• in the third part, I will consider how regulation can help to create the 
environment in which the industry can meet those challenges.  
  
                                                          
2 M. E. Beesley: Rail: The role of subsidy in privatisation, in M. E. Beesley (ed): Regulating 
Utilities: Broadening the Debate (Institute of Economic Affairs, London; 1997) 
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Part 1: What we want from the railways, and the 
evolution of the current system 
 
1. What do we want from the railways? 
 
The railway industry matters.  Though it represents just 3 per cent of passenger 
journeys, or 8 per cent by distance travelled; and 9 per cent of freight movements 
across Britain3, it plays an important role in facilitating sustainable economic growth, 
connecting people and communities and providing a means of transport for people 
and goods which is comparatively efficient in terms of its impact on the 
environment4.  
 
The engineering and economics of rail mean that it is particularly good at some 
things, and less good at others.  It excels in transporting huge numbers of 
commuters into dense centres of employment. It has huge advantages over road on 
haulage of heavy bulk freight like coal, biomass and aggregates.  It competes well 
with road and air on fast, long-distance passenger journeys; and it is competitive 
with road on the distribution of goods in the intermodal sector.  It is less good at 
transporting people over very short distances – the vast majority of journeys in 
Britain– where the car, bikes and walking generally win hands down – accounting for 
rail’s very small share of the total number of passenger journeys.  
 
Rail is central to several key components of our transport demands as an economy.  
So, in common with other regulated sectors, such as energy or water or telecoms, 
the output of the rail industry matters.  It matters because both economic and social 
activity would be constrained without it.  There are substantial social benefits from 
the railway and given the level of ongoing public subsidy – currently at a level of 
£4bn of taxpayers’ money a year, or one-third of its total costs – the efficient and 
effective operation of the railway industry is of significant public interest.   
 
 
                                                          
3 Source: Department for Transport: Rail Trends 2010-11: 3 per cent includes London 
Underground and main line railway.  
 
4 Domestic transport accounts for around 20 percent of the UK’s carbon emissions. Rail 
contributes to these emissions but is relatively environmentally friendly, in emissions per 
passenger mile, compared with road and air. Electric traction means that rail can use low-
carbon sources of electricity as the electricity supply industry decarbonises production 
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2. The origins of today’s railway 
 
I am going to argue that a significantly greater ability in the industry to understand 
costs and revenues, and to make commercial judgements, is key to sustaining 
progress in efficiency and in delivery for customers.  To understand why this 
matters, it is worth taking a few minutes to look at how the industry developed, and 
what has happened since privatisation.  
 
Britain led the world in railway technology, and the spread of the railways particularly 
in the period from 1840 to the end of the nineteenth century was both a driver and a 
facilitator of the later phases of Britain’s industrial revolution, dramatically speeding 
up journey times, reducing the costs of transport and communications, opening up 
and connecting a wide range of markets in goods and services in ways which had 
not previously been possible.   
 
As we have seen in our own time with new technologies, investment in rail in its 
early decades was guided by a mix of commercial logic and heady exuberance.  The 
shape of what later emerged as a national network was determined by a patchwork 
of individual decisions, with entrepreneurs and communities across Britain all 
wanting a piece of the action. So the geographic shape of the railway was a mix of 
rational and haphazard, with some lines never making a profit.  Yet, in one of the 
most profound examples of path dependency, their effects on the distribution of 
economic activity and population were fundamental, and shaped the economic 
geography of Britain for a century, until the rise of lower-cost efficient road transport 
in the second half of the twentieth century.   
 
The inability of the railway companies to make some routes pay, and the precarious 
financial engineering by which some routes were financed, meant that the stability 
of the 100 or so early rail companies was always in jeopardy.  This was exacerbated 
by a shortage of investment both as a result of the First World War and a hiatus 
resulting from a government commitment made in 1914 to nationalise the railways 
at the war’s end.   
 
Though stopping short of nationalisation, the Lloyd George government’s 1921 
Railways Act forced a consolidation of the railway companies into four regional 
monopolies in an attempt to stabilise the situation.  This allowed significant 
improvements in efficiency and a more commercial approach, with the new larger 
rail businesses marketing journeys across larger areas of the country.  Nevertheless, 
from the 1920s rail saw the start of a decline in passenger demand, as buses began 
to compete with rail particularly outside larger cities.  The problem of an extensive 
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network – parts of which could not make a profit even if they were desirable for 
societal reasons, was not addressed, and the Big Four companies struggled 
financially.   
 
In the Second World War, the railways suffered significant damage and renewals 
and maintenance were cut to a minimum – so in 1947 the Atlee government 
decided that the state should take responsibility for managing and funding the 
process of restoring and modernising the national railway, nationalising the private 
companies to form British Railways in 1948.   
 
With the rise of road transport for both passengers and freight, the second half of 
the 20th century saw a steady and substantial decline in demand for rail, with a large 
rise in the railway’s operating losses. Richard Beeching’s famous report of 1963 
identified that one-third of the network carried only 1 per cent of passengers; and 
one-half of the network carried less than 5 per cent of passengers and freight 
combined.5 This led to a very substantial reduction in the size of the network, and at 
the same time there was a deterioration in the ability of the railway to deliver quality 
and compete with road.  Management in the nationalised railway remained regional 
and producer-led, with commercial alignment of railway outputs and what 
consumers wanted only at the margins.  
 
With declining demand, the approach taken to rail generally by managers and policy 
makers alike was one of managed decline, within a public spending framework in 
which investment was constrained by operating losses.  One Chairman of British 
Rail remarked in the 1970s that a large part of his role amounted to shoring up “the 
crumbling edge of quality”.6   There were nevertheless some bold commercially-led 
attempts to restore rail’s fortunes – particularly to retain and grow market share in 
long-distance passenger and freight markets.   
 
Under the Thatcher government, while other privatisations were advanced, rail 
remained solidly in the public sector, the complexity of the industry and level of 
public subsidy thought to make privatisation too difficult.  Instead British Rail 
underwent a major change in its structure to get a more profound commercial 
alignment between the planning and operation of the railway and its markets.   
 
                                                          
5 British Railways Board: The Reshaping of British Railways (HMSO, London; 1963),  Tables 
1 – 3.  
 
6 Sir Peter Parker, British Railways Board Chairman's Report, 1976 (British Railways Board, 
London; 1976) 
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In 1982 British Rail focused its management on the key railway businesses or 
sectors – InterCity, Network South East, Regional, and freight businesses, with clear 
bottom-line accountability.  This led to a focus on the individual markets, a good 
understanding of costs and a reduction of operating losses.  But in the public sector 
the railways remained very much cash constrained, limiting the ability of the sectors 
to invest and renew in order to improve efficiency and to compete. 
 
 
3. Privatisation and beyond 
 
The 1992 White Paper “New opportunities for the Railways”7 set out the Major 
Government’s privatisation agenda, with a key objective defined as “harnessing of 
the management skills, flair and entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector to provide 
better services for the public” with the “introduction of competition through greater 
involvement of the private sector and the ending of BR’s monopoly in the operation 
of services”.   
 
The White Paper pointed to a focus on the sale of the freight businesses and the 
franchising of all passenger services.  The plan was for Railtrack, as the 
infrastructure manager, to stay in public sector into the “medium term”. Significant 
growth in demand or capacity was neither envisaged nor really on the agenda in the 
early 1990s, and this was reflected to a degree in the way privatisation was 
undertaken.   
 
In practice, the privatisation of the hundreds of railway businesses split out of British 
Rail between 1992 and 1997 involved the sale of several freight operating 
companies, the franchising of all passenger services, the floatation of Railtrack, and 
the sale of supply businesses.  This was rather more radical than the White Paper 
had envisaged – with early privatisation of the infrastructure, and the separation of 
maintenance and renewals companies from the natural monopoly component of 
infrastructure management and operation.  This was an attempt to separate out 
markets along the value chain and to identify those in which competition could 
operate effectively – learning from the mistakes in previous ‘monolithic’ 
privatisations in gas and telecoms where too little had been made of the potential to 
develop competition by changing market structure, and from electricity, where there 
had been structural reforms at the time of privatisation and where competition had 
taken hold more quickly.   
                                                          
7 HM Government: “New opportunities for the Railways: White Paper” (HMSO, London; 
1992) 
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The years following privatisation saw accelerating growth in rail usage, partly 
attributable to private sector innovation in marketing, yield management and service 
delivery; but also reflecting road congestion and changing demographics, with for 
example growth in commuter traffic as the service sector developed and 
manufacturing employment fell.  Railtrack however proved not to be up to the job: it 
failed to get a grip on its assets, lost a large proportion of the information it held on 
asset condition as the industry fragmented and people left it; and consequently 
failed to manage its maintenance and renewal contracts effectively. It also failed to 
work out how to accommodate growth or to work effectively with train operators.  
 
Though safety has continued to improve on the privatised railway, a series of 
accidents – including Ladbroke Grove in 1999 and Hatfield in 2000 destroyed any 
remaining legitimacy and credibility of Railtrack. Railtrack ran out of money and the 
government refused to help. 
 
Railtrack was in administration between 2001 and 2002. During this period “the 
discipline of the equity of the company in relation to the control of costs was lost”8 
and costs spiralled to manage ill-understood operational risks.  Network Rail was 
created to take charge of the infrastructure as a statutory corporation, a not-for-profit 
company in the private sector. In 2003-04 Network Rail brought railway maintenance 
(though not renewals and project delivery) in house - effectively taking full control of 
railway assets and operations across the network.   
 
 
4. The institutional structure: regulation and government 
 
The institutional structure of regulation and policy delivery has also developed since 
privatisation, typically lagging behind real world events. 
 
The initial regulatory structure consisted of a franchising authority – the Office of 
Passenger Rail Franchising (or Opraf), and the Rail Regulator. The Regulator focused 
on access to network, and, with the privatisation of Railtrack, economic regulation of 
the infrastructure manager. But the Regulator also took responsibility for consumer 
protection, including in relation to the key consumer benefits of the railway as a 
network.  There was quite a limited direct role for government. 
 
                                                          
8 Tom Winsor, Office of the Rail Regulator (2004).  
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From 2000, the Strategic Rail Authority took on a much wider role of developing and 
implementing government strategy for the railways including franchising.  ORR’s 
role in economic regulation focused on Railtrack and later Network Rail. But, the 
SRA notwithstanding, the Regulator found it difficult to get a clear statement from 
government of what it wanted Network Rail to deliver and at what cost.  
 
The experience of Railtrack in administration followed by Network Rail – a company 
limited by guarantee with no equity and no shareholders has been a key element in 
the way economic regulation has developed, and so as I will argue has the way it is 
funded.  The status of Network Rail – and the absence of shareholders - means that 
the ORR now has to ensure among other things that the company’s remuneration 
schemes incentivise its executives to deliver, a remarkable difference with 
economic regulation in other sectors. The lack of shareholders and equity discipline 
also affects the transmission mechanism for our incentives.   
 
In 2005 the Government passed a further Railways Act, making clear government’s 
responsibility for deciding how much money it wants to spend in the railway, and 
what it expects to get for it – avoiding the problem Tom Winsor had faced in which 
the government – facing a critical renewals backlog but also a large bill – had being 
unwilling to be drawn on either. Government also took direct responsibility for 
franchising, and increasingly got drawn into “how the railway is delivered”. 2005 
also saw the full devolution of rail responsibilities to Scotland, and to a lesser extent 
to Wales and to London. We have since seen real changes in rail priorities in 
Scotland, with separate guidance for our Periodic Reviews from Transport Scotland.  
ORR’s role remained focused on economic regulation of Network Rail and access to 
the network, but also took on the health and safety role and fuller consumer 
protection responsibilities.     
 
So the current structure of regulation in this industry has evolved from that at 
privatisation: 
 
The Office of Rail Regulation – formed between 2004 and 2006 from the merger of 
the economic regulator and the rail section of the Health and Safety Executive9 - is a 
combined economic and safety regulator:  
 
• More than half of ORR’s activity is in safety regulation.10  We are the safety 
regulator for all parts of the industry – the national railway, the Underground 
and metros, trams and light railways, and heritage lines.   
                                                          
9 HSE Rail was, in turn, the successor to HM Railway Inspectorate. 
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• We are the economic regulator for the national rail infrastructure – regulating 
outputs, access to the network and access charges for Network Rail and High 
Speed 1.  
 
• We are the competition and consumer authority for the industry as a whole.  
 
The Department for Transport is the regulator for passenger train services in 
England and Wales, and Transport Scotland regulates the Scottish passenger 
franchise -  determining the specification for a large proportion of train services 
through the franchising process in which train operators compete for the market in 
18 regional route-based franchises; and regulating a portion of the fares to be 
charged.  The Department and Transport Scotland have an important role as funders 
of rail services – in other words, determining what government on behalf of society 
wants to buy from the railway, and how much it is prepared to spend in doing so.  
That funding is channelled partly through train service franchises and also as a block 
annual Network Grant to Network Rail.  
 
In addition to the lead roles of the Governments in Edinburgh and Westminster, 
major purchasing and funding decisions are also taken for their own areas by the 
Welsh Government, the five English Passenger Transport Executives, Transport for 
London and the Strathclyde Partnership for Transport effectively topping up the 
funding provided by the Governments to buy more or different services.  
 
 
5. The performance and efficiency of the railway 
 
How has all this shaped the delivery and performance of the railway?  In the last 
decade rail has been a real success on a number of measures.  Looking at the data: 
 
• passenger numbers are up 45 per cent  -- and passenger revenues up 53 per 
cent – higher growth in the last decade than in any country in Europe, and the 
longest period of sustained growth since the 1920s (see chart 1, at the end of 
this section); 
 
• freight has held up and is growing, 17 per cent up on 2000-01, having 
endured a difficult recession: we have a highly competitive freight market, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Office of Rail Regulation: A great deal from Britain’s railways: safe, reliable, efficient. Our 
business plan for 2012-13. (Office of Rail Regulation, London; 2012), page 11.  
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which has made huge strides in productivity and is an exemplar to the rest of 
the industry (chart 2); 
 
• on a network which is more intensively used and closer to capacity than ever, 
passenger satisfaction is at record levels; and punctuality and reliability of the 
service, while not quite as good as what we’ve paid for, is also close to 
record levels (charts 3 and 4);  
 
• the industry’s recent safety record is good and underlying risks are reducing  - 
though we can’t be complacent, the industry is now among the safest in 
Europe (charts 5 and 6); 
 
• compared to other countries, we have a highly competitive and increasingly 
globalised rail supply market;  
 
• the market for passenger franchises is reasonably competitive and 
importantly, albeit at the margins, there is open access competition, which 
we continue to encourage wherever it is in the interests of customers and 
taxpayers. 
 
Cost, however, is the industry’s Achilles heel (see chart 7).  The cost of the railway 
to taxpayers increased markedly post-Hatfield, as the need to remedy the backlog of 
renewals and maintenance had to be funded, and in administration Railtrack’s costs 
ran out of control.  As a result of Network Rail’s meeting its cost-reduction targets, 
these costs have since returned gradually to more normal levels overall. 
Maintenance costs, in particular, have reduced considerably, though the cost and 
volume of renewals remains higher than before Hatfield – the volume is at 
something more like a sustainable level.  
 
As highlighted by Sir Roy McNulty’s rail value for money study, the unit costs of 
providing services have not fallen: indeed, the overall end result is that costs per 
passenger-km in 2009-10 were similar to those nearly 15 years earlier (see chart 
8)11. 
 
You can see that both the challenges in operating and funding the railway, and 
approaches to its regulation, have changed over the period since privatisation.  I’m 
now going to step back and look at the current structure of the industry and its 
regulation.  I’ll then look at the respects in which the industry and regulation can 
step up to deliver better for customers and taxpayers in the next decade.  
  
                                                          
11 McNulty (2011) 
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Chart 1: Rail passenger demand: since 1947:  
sustained growth since the late 1990s 
 
 
Source: Department for Transport and Office of Rail Regulation 
 
 
Chart 2: Rail freight since 1953:  
recovery since the mid-1990s, and renewed growth post-recession 
 
Source: Department for Transport and Office of Rail Regulation 
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Chart 3: Passenger satisfaction, 1999-2011 
 
 
Source: Passenger Focus’s National Passenger Survey. 
 
 
Chart 4: Passenger service reliability and punctuality since 1998 
 
 
The chart shows the monthly annual average for the Public Performance Measure, the 
proportion of trains arriving at their destination within 5 minutes (10 minutes for long-
distance trains) of the scheduled time.  
Source: Office of Rail Regulation and Network Rail  
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Chart 5: Long-term decline in fatal train accidents in Britain since 1950 
 
Source: Office of Rail Regulation 
 
Chart 6:  Comparative safety across Europe fatalities per million train 
kilometres, 2004-2009 
 
Source: Office of Rail Regulation, Safety Report 2011 
  
17 
 
Chart 7: Total government support to the rail industry (£ millions), 
including Passenger Transport Executive grants, 1985-86 to 2011-12 
 
Source: Department for Transport and Office of Rail Regulation 
 
 
Chart 8: Whole-system unit costs, 1996-97 to 2009-10 
Industry spend per passenger kilometre  
 
Source: McNulty (2011) 
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Part 2: Today’s railway and regulation 
 
6. Why do we regulate the railways? 
 
Market structure 
 
Why do we regulate the railway industry?  To answer this, let us first consider the 
industry’s key characteristics.  The rail industry value chain is highly fragmented - 
partly as a result of the way British Rail was subdivided at privatisation, structuring 
the industry so as to encourage the development of competitive markets where 
possible.  
 
   Table 1: The rail industry’s supply chain 
 
 
There are multiple markets and companies serving them – many with multi-million 
pound turnovers – all along the value chain. As table 1 shows, the number of 
suppliers and the level of competition varies hugely across the value chain.  Network 
Rail has no competitors. We have three businesses leasing rolling stock.  There are 
numerous train operating companies, though they are consolidated into a smaller 
number of groups such as First Group and Go Ahead - and during the course of their 
franchise contracts, there is very little competition between them.  But there is very 
limited competition between passenger operators except through franchising, and 
we continue to champion open access entrants to the market – where it is in the 
interests of customers and taxpayers. There is significant competition in other parts 
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of the value chain: there are many players in the globalised supply chain, as there 
are too in retail to passengers and freight customers. 
 
The rationale for regulation 
 
The need for regulation in the railway industry is easy to express.   
 
First, regulation is needed to ensure that the industry is safely managed and 
operated, and that the safety and health of its employees is safeguarded.  Of course 
this is primarily the responsibility of the businesses operating in the industry, the 
‘duty-holders’. But regulation is there to ensure compliance and to make sure that 
the industry continues to manage risks downward in an industry with numerous 
complex interfaces between businesses and which faces substantial change.12  
 
Second, the railway has significant monopolistic activities (for example providing 
track, signalling and stations) and many train service providers are also near-
monopolies – that is, having competed for the right to run a franchise, operators 
face very little on-rail competition for the duration of their contract, and in some 
cases face weak competition from other modes. So the sector is regulated in the 
public interest:  
 
• to protect consumers and businesses against monopolistic behaviours which 
can result in inefficiency and lead to higher prices and worse service, including 
by making markets work better and empowering consumers; and 
 
• to safeguard the basic interests and expectations of consumers – for example 
to ensure that they get the information they need to make choices, and get the 
benefits of the railway as a network. 
 
Third, as Michael Beesley discussed in 1997, there is a particular, defining 
characteristic of this industry, compared with other industries which are subject to 
economic regulation.  Substantial amounts of public money are invested in the 
railway.  There will always be a strong case for subsidy to secure services which 
deliver wider social, environmental and economic benefits but which would not be 
commercially viable without taxpayer support.  So in the rail context, regulation also 
                                                          
12 We recently published our revised health and safety strategy, explaining how we regulate 
proportionate to risk and focus on management excellence as the key approach to ensuring 
rail businesses are in the best possible position to comply with the law and manage risk, 
while also getting better at other aspects of management which improve their overall 
business performance. Office of Rail Regulation: ORR’s strategy for regulation of health and 
safety risks (Office of Rail Regulation, London, 2012) 
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ensures that taxpayers are getting value for their money; and provides transparency 
on what that money is buying and where it is going.   
 
Fourthly, as in many other regulated industries, rail is a long term business. 
Investments are large and lumpy, and long-lived.  This means that in assessing what 
the industry needs to spend in each five-year control period, judgements need to be 
made about the capacity, quality and cost of the network decades ahead; and the 
regulator needs to create a framework in which long-term investments can be 
properly remunerated, notwithstanding that in Network Rail at least, they are 
currently financed through public rather than private investment.    
 
How do we regulate?     
 
It is not surprising given the differences between the markets across the rail value 
chain that they are regulated differently – though general competition law applies at 
all stages of the value chain.  
 
Table 2: The rail industry’s value chain: a variety of approaches to regulation 
 
 
 
As table 2 shows, this has led to a diversity of regulatory approaches across the 
industry, reflecting the different market structures in different parts of the value 
chain.  In particular two of the largest parts of the industry, with the closest 
interfaces, are regulated in different ways – franchised train operating companies by 
contract, and Network Rail by licence.  So in rail not only do we have real, 
operational interfaces to deal with, and the usual interfaces between regulation and 
the market, we have made life more complex for ourselves by creating an interface 
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between two fundamentally different modes of regulation.13  This is a real issue 
where decisions need to be coordinated – for example on infrastructure capacity and 
train capacity; on electrification and signalling, which require interdependent 
decisions on and investments in infrastructure and rolling stock, and the skills and 
training of staff across the industry. 
 
 
7. A normal industry? 
 
By any standards, rail is not a normal industry.  This is clear by comparison with 
other regulated markets such as energy and water.  In particular 
 
• the challenges of value for money and financing in rail are greater than and 
different from other regulated industries. Across the industry as a whole, 
commercial revenues are much lower than costs (see chart 9);  
 
• there is consequently a large funding gap - £4 bn in 2011-12 – which is funded 
by taxpayers; this funds the level and quality of service, finances investment, 
and subsidises fares; 
 
• the mismatch of revenues and costs means that the industry is heavily 
dependent on public investment – at least in the infrastructure; 
 
• the combination of public subsidy and public investment has led to high levels 
of government involvement and intervention; 
  
• behaviours in the industry are thus to an unhealthy degree driven or 
conditioned by subsidy and intervention by government and the regulator, 
rather than commercial decisions;  
 
• there are significant monopoly elements in the sector – especially the 
ownership of the bulk of Britain’s national rail infrastructure by a single 
company, Network Rail; and franchised train companies which operate as near-
monopolists during the period of their franchise;  
 
  
                                                          
13  Stern (2012) sets out the difference and relative merits of regulation through contract and 
regulation though licence and agency.  
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Chart 9: Industry real net cash position, 1989-90 to 2009-10  
£bn, 2009-10 prices  
 
Source: McNulty (2011) 
 
 
• retail competition is limited by the structure of franchised passenger services, 
judged at the time of privatisation to be the most efficient way – in the short 
term14 - of procuring a socially-desirable level of train services which the 
market would not provide. Franchisees are regulated by the Department for 
Transport, acting as both economic regulator and procurement agency;   
 
• the passenger railway has been increasingly subject to “political” regulation 
with the breakdown of the clear separation of franchise letting and 
management from government in the initial model. Ministers have become 
much more involved in very detailed decision making.  Detailed government 
specification, which can act as a barrier to change, inevitably increases the 
overall cost of the railway, at any level of outputs government (quite 
legitimately) chooses; 
 
• the infrastructure is provided and managed by a monopoly business, which is 
complex, cumbersome in its delivery though striving to do better;  
 
• there have also been concerns about the structure of the rolling-stock market 
and the behaviour of the rolling stock companies, which the ORR referred to 
                                                          
14 Swift (2000), p220, is particularly entertaining on this point. 
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the Competition Commission, and with informational remedies being put in 
place following a market investigation which concluded in 2009.15 
 
All of this means that over the last decade, the rail industry has been missing, for 
the most part, the commercial relationships and drivers which are present in most 
regulated utilities; it has been prone to detailed decision-making and intervention by 
government, by which I mean both civil servants and ministers; and it has been 
susceptible to over-detailed regulation – from both the ORR and the Department for 
Transport. As a consequence of these factors, much of the industry has been 
subject to bureaucratic rather than commercial management and decision-making.   
 
As I have set out, I believe that the industry has been a remarkable success through 
the last decade, but the factors I have described above now jeopardise the next leap 
forward in quality, capacity, customer service and value for money, and need to be 
addressed.   
 
 
  
                                                          
15 Competition Commission (2009) 
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Part 3: Meeting the challenges of the next decade 
 
8. What are the challenges for the next decade? 
 
What are the next steps that are expected of the railway – by its customers and 
funders?  I will now consider what needs to be achieved in the next decade.   
 
Recent successes notwithstanding, there is a growing sense that the industry is 
reaching the limits of what can be achieved with current approaches and capabilities 
– the strains are starting to show.  It is well documented I do not accept that the 
system’s existing achievement of punctuality and reliability cannot be improved at 
current levels of investment: there is much that the industry can do before it 
reaches the frontier of what is reasonably practical. It is nevertheless true that the 
next substantial advances in the quality and efficiency of the industry will be very 
hard to achieve without  
 
• a stronger focus on delivering for customers; 
• significant advances in asset management and information;  
• greater transparency on how public money is being used , and what the 
railway is delivering with it;  
• greater simplification of the  standards and rules which in many cases are so 
bureaucratic and prescriptive that they undermine the management of the 
risks they are supposedly there to support;  
• improvements in  maintenance and renewals productivity;  
• a move away from the traditional one-size-fits all approach to delivering 
infrastructure regardless of user needs;  
• tackling barriers which inhibit collaboration between the infrastructure 
provider and train operators to improve whole-system performance and 
efficiency for customers.   
 
A number of challenges face the industry over the next 5 to 10 years, and the 
industry itself needs to develop a clear sense of how it is going to meet them.  In 
summary the key challenges, set out by various bodies tasked with defining railway 
outputs16, are:  
                                                          
16 Broadly speaking this means the Department for Transport, Transport Scotland, the Welsh 
Assembly Government, the English Passenger Transport Executives, the Strathclyde 
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• tackling the value for money challenge set out by Sir Roy McNulty17; 
• getting more out of the railway’s existing capacity; 
• building on the good recent safety record, as the industry goes through a 
period of change, and ensuring the industry moves closer to excellence in 
health and safety management as its management maturity improves;  
• enhancing the network without inconveniencing today’s customers;  
• improving customer satisfaction: meeting rising expectations on the quality of 
the passenger experience and better information; better responsiveness and 
accountability to customers, and better accessibility to stations and trains; 
• serving the changing demands of freight to help the economy to grow; 
• improving the reliability of assets so that customers experience better 
reliability; and  
• raising rail’s environmental performance. 
 
That is a long list of expectations, and there is much to achieve.  We recently 
consulted on the framework of outputs which we will expect Network Rail to deliver 
as part of our regulatory determination for the period 2014 to 2019, and will set out 
our decisions in our draft determination in June.18  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Partnership for Transport, Transport for London, the ORR and Passenger Focus; as well as 
customers themselves and their representative bodies, in both passenger and freight 
markets. 
 
17 McNulty (2011) 
 
18 Office of Rail Regulation: Network Rail's output framework for 2014-19 (Office of Rail 
Regulation, London, 2012) 
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9. The challenges of efficiency and delivery 
 
Efficiency is the key to so much else, so I am going to focus on it.  Serious amounts 
of public money are going into the industry.  This is in itself a signal of confidence in 
the railway’s ability to deliver. And at a time when fiscal consolidation means that 
public spending is under massive pressure across all budgets, Government’s 
commitment to rail is rising, not falling. As a hardened public spending watcher, I 
find this level of commitment genuinely remarkable.  Politicians are convinced that 
the railways have a big contribution to make to economic growth and social 
wellbeing, and they are backing that conviction with cash.19  
 
A key question, and one highlighted by Roy McNulty, is whether this level of public 
subsidy is sustainable and whether future governments will continue to invest in rail 
infrastructure. That is why value for money really matters.  Value for money is the 
industry’s licence to grow.  
 
Let us consider this in terms of productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency.  
 
Productive efficiency     
 
Firstly, productive efficiency.  The costs of delivering the railway’s current outputs 
are too high across the industry.  Sir Roy McNulty’s Rail Value for Money study 
identified potential industry-wide annual cost savings on a 2008-09 base of between 
£2.7bn and £3.8bn by 2018-19, using a combination of top-down and bottom-up cost 
comparator approaches to estimate what the railway would cost if it was operating 
efficiently.20  McNulty estimated that around 70 per cent of these savings could 
come from Network Rail, with the other 30 per cent coming from the rest of the 
industry.  This included, for example, estimates of productivity improvements in 
maintenance and renewals, gains from better procurement, and collaboration to 
reduce the costs that Network Rail and the train operators impose on each other.  
ORR’s determination of 2008 is set to close at least half of the efficiency gap 
identified for Network Rail by 2014, with the remainder achievable in the following 
five years by 2019.  Indeed Network Rail has already identified how it will address 
the bulk of the remaining gap in the Initial Industry Plan for 2014 to 2019.     
 
Allocative efficiency     
                                                          
19 HM Government (2012) 
 
20 McNulty (2011).  Values expressed in 2011-12 prices.  
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Secondly, allocative efficiency. Is the industry using the scarce resources available 
to it, to produce what its customers and society value most?  Of course priorities for 
the railway come from a number of sources, including its customers and importantly 
its funders.  Government has a particular role on behalf of society in making sure 
that the railway delivers outputs which the market would not provide.    
 
But even a cursory examination of what would need to be in place to facilitate 
allocative efficiency gives cause for concern.  On a railway which is carrying as many 
people as in the 1920s, but on a much smaller network, it is not surprising that parts 
of the network are getting very close to capacity. So one of the scarcest resources 
of all is network capacity.  And yet it is not priced!  The Variable Usage Charge 
which Network Rail is currently allowed to charge operators reflects short-run 
marginal cost, but has no element to reflect the scarcity of the capacity or its value 
in competing uses. Of course it is always hard to reconcile short-run network use 
incentives with long-run investment incentives: but I am convinced that we can do it 
better.  
 
Chart 10 shows the current position in terms of Network Rail’s revenue.  User 
charges earned by running trains account for a small proportion – around a quarter – 
of Network rail’s revenues.  The bulk of the rest – the large blue segment - is made 
up by a block payment to Network Rail from the government known as Network 
Grant. A part of Network Grant finances investment. But in practice a significant part 
simply makes up the shortfall between costs and revenue from charges without 
differentiating what Government and other funders want to buy.   
 
Chart 11 illustrates the incentive effects of the current structure of funding. It shows 
how Network Rail’s efforts to accommodate more trains on its crowded network 
over the last few years have generated more revenue for the business over the last 
few years. The unfortunate truth is – they haven’t!   Though it has allowed more 
trains to run, the chart shows that as the number of train miles run and scarce 
capacity used rises, there has been almost no impact on revenue. The gain from 
running 10 per cent more trains is the tiny red sliver on the small variable income 
block for each year.  
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, price signals are very weak and play almost no role in 
decisions on allocating, planning or expanding capacity.   
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Chart 10: Network Rail’s sources of revenue: Network Rail’s revenue 
requirement for CP4 (2008-09 to 2013-14) is £31.7bn (in 2011-12 prices).  
 
Source: Office of Rail Regulation 
 
 
Chart 11: What happens to Network Rail’s income as volume increases? 
(Answer: almost nothing). Network Rail’s income in respect of passenger 
trains, 2009-10 to 2011-12, at 2011-12 prices.  
 
 
Source: Office of Rail Regulation 
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The franchising system determines a large part of what the industry delivers, both in 
train services and in the infrastructure to support them.  Government is therefore a 
large and important customer of the railway industry.  But I would like to see much 
more direct accountability of the industry to its actual customers – passengers in 
particular.  We see this already in freight, where operators are wholly driven by the 
needs of their customers, competing for many of them with road.   
 
Network Grant exists for good reasons. As Tom Winsor noted in his final report as 
Rail Regulator,  
 
“simply raising access charges by [£7bn over the 5 years to 2009, in the 
wake of Hatfield] would have caused very significant difficulties for the public 
finances... Accordingly, whilst maintaining the integrity of the settlement and 
therefore the overall amounts which Network Rail is entitled to receive... I 
accepted a proposal from Network Rail, supported by government, that a 
higher proportion of Network Rail’s income should come in the form of 
[government] grants ... and that the money should not have to be passed 
through the passenger train operators.”21 
 
My view is that Network Rail’s ability to rely on Network Grant since 2004, and the 
correspondingly small portion of its revenue earned directly from its customers in 
the train operating companies, has undermined its incentives to respond to train 
operators and to think commercially. That in turn has weakened the whole industry’s 
ability to focus on its final customers – passengers and freight users.  
 
Network Rail is doing many of the right things to get closer to its customers – the 
devolution of decision-making to directors for each of its ten routes being a major 
step in the right direction (see chart 12). Devolution is potentially a major step 
forward, allowing route directors much more discretion in how they provide 
infrastructure services to the train companies; to assess how best to raise 
performance and improve efficiency.  Importantly it creates a kind of market for 
management within Network Rail, with the opportunity to draw comparisons and 
lessons from different approaches, and ultimately to benchmark.  
 
  
                                                          
21 Tom Winsor, in Office of the Rail Regulator (2004). 
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Chart 12:  Devolution: Network Rail’s route structure 
 
 
 
Source: Network Rail 
 
We already have in place separate regulatory accounts at the route level and we will 
be looking to refine these over the next control period to 2019 and to build on them 
with route level performance data, and potentially in due course, disaggregated 
revenues reflecting disaggregated charges.  In this way it will become clear what 
customers and taxpayers are paying for the different parts of the network and what 
they are getting in return.  
 
Network Rail and the UK Government have both shown an interest in varying 
degrees of extra freedom for the routes – including developing infrastructure 
concessions, which could help to bring equity and private investment into the rail 
infrastructure market. And Network Rail and train operators are exploring the scope 
for further formal allowancing – the first alliance between South West Trains and the 
Wessex Route of Network Rail is already resulting in different approaches to 
working and prioritising to improve efficiency, performance and revenue growth.  In 
our Periodic Review, we are considering incentives to encourage further route-level 
collaboration. 
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There is certainly the potential for the routes to be powerfully incentivised to strike 
commercial deals with their customers, and in the process to make sure they make 
the best returns from the scarce network capacity  they have at their disposal by 
providing what customers want and improving their own efficiency.  This also gives 
the train companies the incentive to act more commercially with Network Rail, 
brokering different options for the delivery and use of infrastructure services, 
pressing the routes to improve efficiency, and considering their own use of the 
network to identify ways in which they can reduce the infrastructure costs they end 
up paying. 
 
But as long as the bulk of its income is received by Network Rail as a block, without 
bearing any direct relationship with the infrastructure service the routes provide to 
their customers, the routes will essentially remain cost centres, rather than profit 
centres.  And it will be harder to achieve the cultural shift within Network Rail and in 
its relationships with its customers, from the bureaucratic and towards the 
commercial. This in my view is at the heart of the change we need to see to unlock 
the potential of the railway for the next decade.  
 
There is a solution to this.  We are looking, alongside the Periodic Review, at the 
scope for adjusting variable charges to reflect capacity and scarcity; and to better 
reflect the structure of costs, including at a route level.  If Network Rail can improve 
its efficiency between now and 2019, in the way we and McNulty envisage, there is 
the opportunity for a substantial rebalancing in the sources of the company’s 
revenue, from block grant to usage- and capacity-related prices for the infrastructure 
services it provides.  That will allow the governments’ Network Grant to be 
focussed on the finance of network enhancements (as opposed to more general 
capex and other spending). It will also help to align costs and revenues within 
Network Rail at route level, so that route directors are able to make genuinely 
commercial propositions to their customers, in full knowledge of what their different 
options cost and what they will earn from them, and with bottom line accountability. 
This would, in other words, help Network Rail and its routes to become much more 
like a real business.   
 
We are consulting on this in preparation for the Periodic Review, and without pre-
judging the outcome, a move in this direction seems to me to have huge 
advantages for the railway and its funders and customers.   
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Dynamic efficiency     
 
In principle, if we can get these incentives right, then the third element of efficiency 
- dynamic efficiency - ought to follow.  But things are never so simple.  Dynamic 
efficiency is always difficult to measure.  There is a great temptation to say that 
innovation is good and so more of it must be better.  The railway has innovated but 
there appears to be more that could be done, in the application of technology to 
improve costs and performance, but also in developing the offer to the customer, 
and in developing the use of scarce capacity.  Our efficiency challenge in the 
Periodic Review will help to drive dynamic efficiency in Network Rail, and to an 
extent through the value chain.   
 
Most of what I have said so far focuses on Network Rail’s efficiency.  Indeed in 
recent years most of the pressure has been on Network Rail to reduce its own 
costs.  But McNulty showed that if the industry is to achieve its full efficiency 
potential, it will need to look across the railway as a system. McNulty estimated that 
around 30 per cent of the industry-wide efficiency he identified was to come from 
the rest of the industry, that’s £0.8bn-£1.3bn a year - including from the train 
operators.   
 
Decisions made now on franchising are critical to driving efficiencies from 
passenger service provision. For example our benchmarking analysis of train 
operating company costs22 shows that the savings identified by McNulty are to 
some extent locked-in by the relatively detailed specification of the current franchise 
agreements. 
 
Ensuring value for money may also mean that it makes sense to look at different 
models to reflect the different rail passenger markets – long-distance, London & 
South East commuter and regional – each of which has very different characteristics 
in terms of patterns of demand, operation and risks, as well as infrastructure 
requirements. Richard Brown’s current independent review of franchising is 
considering the best way to secure passenger rail services with respect to 
consumer satisfaction, national and local needs, value for money for users and 
taxpayers: it is therefore very important in the context of achieving the whole-
industry savings McNulty identified.  
 
                                                          
22 Office of Rail Regulation: Costs and Revenues of Franchised Passenger Train Operators in 
the UK (Office of Rail Regulation, London; 2012, forthcoming) 
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Efficiency – productive, allocative and dynamic – together with the need for a more 
commercial culture in the industry, are at the heart of the problem we are trying to 
solve.  How, then, can we make best use of the array of regulatory tools we have to 
solve them?   Perhaps counter-intuitively, I suspect that the answer, at least in the 
medium to long term, lies in less regulation rather than more. In the final part of this 
lecture, I want to develop that theme.  
 
  
10. Releasing the railway’s potential  
I was asked to address the question of the railway’s efficiency. I’m conscious that 
I’ve gone rather wider than that.  Because I think the real question is – how can the 
industry make the next strides forward, in delivering for its customers, efficiency, 
quality and capacity, and do so in a way which keeps both private and public 
investors willing to invest?    
 
My view is that commercial incentives are a key way in which this will be delivered 
– and this is true incidentally regardless of the ownership model chosen.  As 
efficiency improves, so the industry will become less dependent on generalised 
subsidy. The transparency of the industry’s costs is improving, and we want to get 
to the point where government and other funders are able to focus the subsidy they 
choose to put in, on the specific services and capacity they are buying for society 
that the market will not deliver, rather than the current approach which is simply to 
keep topping up a bucket labelled ‘aggregate costs minus aggregate revenues’.  
That should mean government can step back from its detailed involvement right 
across the railway.  Notwithstanding the fact that I have worked in and around 
government for a long time, I have been genuinely amazed in my time in the 
railways at the amount of detailed government involvement in specifying and 
managing what the industry delivers. Of course government is free to intervene as it 
chooses wherever it is paying – and as we have seen, it is committing very 
substantial resources to rail. But excessive specification and intervention drives up 
the cost of delivering what it wants, and more widely undermines the ability of the 
industry’s leaders and managers to take a commercial approach. 
 
Having made some early progress on the McNulty agenda, the industry, led by the 
Rail Delivery Group, has a key role in achieving change.  Firstly, it needs to 
demonstrate that the costs of the railway can be reduced. We see big opportunities 
in the next Control Period to 2019, and beyond, but they increasingly require the 
industry to work together across business (and regulatory) boundaries – including 
but not limited to collaboration across track and train.   Secondly the industry needs 
to demonstrate to government that it is on top of how the railway is delivered. It’s 
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up to government and users to say what they want from the railway; it’s up to the 
industry to have a credible story about how it will deliver. The more the industry can 
show it is able to do that, the more likely it is that government will give it more 
space. 
 
Independent regulation can and should play a significant role in this.  A first major 
step is our Periodic Review where we want to set the right targets and encourage 
the industry to work together.  We’re coming to some key decisions on that, ahead 
of our draft determination for Network Rail in June. Those decisions will include - as 
I have described – options for creating the framework of better aligned incentives, 
cost transparency and better aligned costs and charges to support the industry to 
move towards an approach led by commercial propositions which deliver better 
efficiency and customer service.  
 
ORR is exploring with people across the railway how we best create a climate that 
genuinely aligns incentives across the industry, and encourages the further 
development of alliances and partnerships. 
  
Beyond all that, we should increasingly think of rail becoming more of a “normal” 
sector.  Greater efficiency will reduce the railway’s dependence on subsidy, and 
whatever levels of subsidy funders choose to provide in the future, their funds can 
be more focused on the specific things they want to buy.  With the railway less 
dependent on subsidy, government can be less involved in the detail, leaving how 
the railway is delivered to the industry.  And if – as I have suggested, the industry 
can operate increasingly on the basis of proper, transparent and grown-up 
commercial arrangements, then I believe that the role of regulation should become 
less interventionist too.  
 
Government will still want assurance that it is getting value for money, that longer 
term objectives will be delivered and that market failures be addressed. In other 
sectors this is the role of the independent regulator. Effective economic regulation 
allows a reduction in the amount of detailed intervention, and helps to create an 
environment in which businesses can plan ahead, invest, innovate and grow. 
   
This industry could be much more business-led, and much less driven by 
government and regulation. The Government paper23 published in March makes 
clear that the Westminster Government sees rail moving that way too; alongside 
                                                          
23 HM Government: Reforming our railways - Putting the customer first. Command paper. 
March 2012. 
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greater transparency to users and taxpayers of what the industry is delivering and 
how much it costs, which is a central part of the industry’s legitimacy with its 
funders and users.  
 
That does not mean undermining the franchising business model, though there is 
much that needs to change to make sure that franchising delivers both value for 
money and what customers want.  I can well see alternative methods of provision 
being introduced in time for some types of services - including through open access 
competition, as envisaged at the time of privatisation.  But it does mean that 
independent regulation, working to a defined set of rules, can help separate more 
clearly the political decisions that are for government and the delivery decisions that 
are for the industry – a confusion that currently bedevils the railway.  
 
Other sectors have shown that, properly targeted, independent regulation can be of 
value to companies in the sector, as well as to users and government.  We could 
move in this industry to a very different type of regulation, which gives more 
flexibility and freedom to rail businesses.  If commercial relationships and the 
market are working well the role of regulation can and should be significantly 
reduced.  This is our approach on both safety and economic regulation.  On safety 
we take a risk-based approach, which assesses the management competencies of 
businesses in the industry to manage safety and other risks, and we intervene less 
where businesses can show that their own systems and staff have risks well 
understood and managed.  
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11. Conclusion 
 
If the industry can deliver on efficiency between now and 2019, it will be possible to 
reduce its dependence on public subsidy, and to get much greater transparency on 
where public money goes and what it buys. National and local funders should have 
better choices over how their money is used and what they get for it. The industry 
ought then to become freer to take its own decisions on how best to meet its 
customers’ expectations and grow demand.  
 
There is further to go on customer satisfaction, and rail businesses need to focus on 
how they can meet rising expectations through better customer service, better 
information, improved services and value, and innovation – just as they do in other 
sectors. This potential is all the greater given the scope for major changes in the 
way the railway operates through electrification and transformed signalling and 
information systems, as well as more devolved decision-making. It requires a much 
stronger focus on the industry’s customers, a whole-system approach to delivery 
and efficiency, and ultimately, proper bottom-line accountability.  
 
This is a real challenge in an industry where finances are opaque and decision-
making byzantine in its complexity. That needs to change. As efficiency improves, 
and costs, revenues and incentives become better aligned, I believe we can move 
towards a railway in which businesses can shape business propositions and come 
together in a commercial way to deliver for their customers, with less intervention 
from ORR and government. We can transform the way the industry operates in the 
next decade, and all of us need to step up to make that a reality. 
 
 
Richard Price  
Office of Rail Regulation 
November 2012 
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